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The Temperament of Empire. Law and Conquest in late nineteenth century India
1
 
 
Final text as published in Gunnel Cederlof and Sanjukta Das Gupta, Subjects, Citizens 
and Law. Colonial and Postcolonial India (Routledge, 2016). 
 
Jon Wilson 
King’s College London 
 
I. 
The administration of justice occurred in an impatient and suspicious mood in the north 
Indian town of Allahabad during the late 1880s and early 1890s. The anxious atmosphere 
in the High Court centred on conflict between the British judges and Justice Syed 
Mahmud. Second son of the north Indian Muslim leader Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Mahmud 
was appointed as a permanent member of the Allahabad bench in 1886, after acting up 
when British judges went on leave since 1879. Two successive chief justices, Comer 
Petheram and John Edge, didn’t want an Indian on the bench. But at a time of political 
unease, when British administrators had lost the confidence which followed their re-
conquest of North India in 1857-8 and Muslim loyalty in particular was questioned, 
senior imperial officers imagined appointing an Indian judge would consolidate the 
loyalty of elite groups well-disposed to British rule. The former law member of the 
Governor-General’s Council, Sir Arthur Hobhouse, argued that Mahmud's appointment 
would cement his father's loyalty to the imperial regime. Similarly, the Governor of the 
North-West Provinces felt ‘it was most desirable that at least one of the judges of the 
Court be a Native’.2 
 
Mahmud’s support from the imperial hierarchy didn’t stop his time on the bench being a 
period of fractious argument. Mahmud and his ‘brother judges’ disagreed on some major 
points of law, and squabbled over minor procedural matters. His enemies, particularly 
Chief Justice Sir John Edge, described him as a disordered drunk with terrible time-
                                                        
1 I’d like to thank audiences at Oxford University’s South Asian History Seminar and European 
Association of South Asian Studies at Zurich for comments on this paper, and to Gunnel Cederlof and 
Sanjukta Dasgupta for comments. 
2 Arthur Hobhouse, “Native Indian Judges: Mr. Ilbert’s Bill,” The Contemporary Review, January 1, 
1883 
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keeping. Mahmud himself claimed his colleagues were impatient autocrats, ignorant of 
India and not willing to put the effort into knowing the country they ruled. He noted that 
the Chief Justice treated him like a conquered subject rather than an equal. ‘If’, he 
suggested, ‘John Edge had only allowed himself enough time to understand the Indian 
laws and the facts of Indian life, before assuming the position of ‘Veni, vidi, vici’ he 
might have made even a better Chief Justice than he is now’, Mahmud sardonically wrote 
in 1893. Eventually, relations broke down so badly Edge contemplated sacking Mahmud. 
But Mahmud felt so humiliated he resigned first.
3
 
 
Mahmud’s difficult relationship with his British colleagues occurred in spite of his 
agreement with them about many things. Mahmud was fluent in English, educated at 
Cambridge and well-read in Roman as well as Indian law. He was possibly an agnostic 
and certainly a supporter of British rule. Throughout his life he argued that British rule 
was ‘the only alternative of anarchy and barbarism’. As Gregory Kozlowski suggested, 
the style of jurisprudence which Mahmud administered was a radical departure from the 
idioms of pre-colonial Muslim jurisprudence still practised outside British courts. 
Mahmud learned ‘not only his law but his Arabic in England’. This background alienated 
him from some of his Indian neighbours. One Urdu newspaper suggested he was ‘not a 
native in the proper sense of the term’, having ‘adopted the customs and manners of 
Europeans’. Mahmud’s seeming assimilation to ostensibly European values and practices 
was never the object of condescension amongst British officers. Quite the reverse in fact. 
As we shall see, the British judges’ problem with Mahmud was that, despite his English 
education and Anglophile political opinions, he was still too closely embedded within 
‘native’ life. It was his conduct, not his identity or his beliefs, which elicited a critical 
response from his British fellow ‘brother judges’, and led to his dismissal from the bench, 
his descent into heavy drinking and his early death.
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3 Syed Mahmud, “Letter to Government of NW Provinces,” October 30, 1892, 64, L/PJ/6/355, 
no.1680, IOR. 
4 Syed Mahmud, “British Rule in India. Does It Owe Its Origin to Conquest, and Its  Maintenance to 
Physical Force?,” Calcutta Review, 1879, 68 (135): 4; Gregory C. Kozlowski, Muslim Endowments and 
Society in British India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 119. 
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This chapter examines the practice of the law in north India, particularly the professional 
life of Syed Mahmud, to challenge the way historians think about both imperial power 
and South Asian subject-hood during the nineteenth century. During the last forty years, 
scholars have argued that British rule was a project of mental domination. What Partha 
Chatterjee describes as ‘the rule of colonial difference’ created systems of knowledge that 
classified Indian subjects as inferior, backward, and incapable of exercising their own 
sovereign power. Empire was, from this perspective, a paradoxical pedagogical project 
that aimed to teach Indians how to rule themselves whilst violently denying their power. 
Behind the production of an important swathe of scholarship on the ‘texts of power’ 
(again to use Chatterjee’s phrase) that buttressed imperial authority, this literature 
nonetheless over-estimates the place of formal discourse in the mechanics of colonial 
rule. It presupposes that practices of domination can be reduced to forms of thought 
reproduced in a textual form, thus neglecting the scale to which texts and action can be 
out of kilter with one another. Recent scholarship has little to say about the everyday 
encounters – such as those in court I began this chapter with – through which domination 
was asserted in practice, however much that domination might have been described in 
another form in rhetoric. As Mahmud correctly recognised, British officers did not see 
themselves as the confident tutors of an inferior race, but as an embattled ruling class 
whose violent power was in danger of being undermined. Empire was a process of 
conquest not a project of pedagogy. To understand this essential character of imperial 
rule, the forms of subjectivity it tried to produce and the practical way Indians acted out 
their own lives in relation to it, my argument is that historians should shift their attention 
from the realm of ideas and categories to those of emotions and practices 
5. 
 
In fact, constructing knowledge about its subject population was anything but a priority 
for the functionaries of the British regime, the men who staffed courts and revenue 
offices like Sir John Edge. Their domination was asserted in a less cerebral, much more 
visceral register than recent historians imagine. British officers were keenly aware they 
                                                        
5 P. Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments. Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1993, pp.16–27; Partha Chatterjee, Texts of Power: Emerging Disciplines 
in Colonial Bengal Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota Press, 1995; Sanjay Seth, Subject Lessons: The 
Western Education of Colonial India, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007. 
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were members of a tiny European class which did not have the consent of the people they 
ruled. Most Britons in late nineteenth-century India thought British power ultimately 
rested on violence. The priority for imperial officers was to have their conquest of India 
affirmed, at least not challenged. That affirmation came through the visible absence of 
resistance and the seeming continuation of Indian subjection. Both before and after the 
great rebellion of 1857-8, the over-riding British concern was security and certainty, to 
prevent rebellion on a scale capable of undermining imperial lives and lifestyles. Always 
aware of the limitations of their authority, British officers were seized by a mood which 
was prickly and often paranoid, which interpreted every action that didn’t fit with their 
expectations as a potentially major slight. 
 
By the time Syed Mahmud was appointed to the Allahabad High Court, British rule had 
constructed a series of self-contained systems of rule in order to curtail forms of 
negotiation and challenge that had the potential to undermine British power. These 
systems asserted power in many different ways: they regulated the flow of water, 
attempted to reduce the heterogeneity of the human-created landscape to the survey map, 
to transport goods at the regular pace dictated by the steam engine on metal tracks, and to 
regulate the conduct of Indian economic and social interaction by reducing it to rules 
transmitted in portable law books. What these different systems had in common was their 
use of imperial power to imposing authority on a world of things at some distance from 
the lives of the people they ruled. Whether in the law or in increasingly large-scale 
technological projects like railways or irrigation systems, British rule tried to manipulate 
a standardised, objective world in. Unlike even English-trained lawyers like Syed 
Mahmud, this world of stone, steel and paper did not talk back. In fact, these material 
processes of government barely considered the people of India as an object of 
government at all.
6
 
 
But imperial systems created their own forms of practical knowledge. The regular 
operation of imperial institutions was supposed to be assured through rulebooks and 
                                                        
6 Jon E. Wilson, India Conquered. Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, London: Simon and Schuster, 
forthcoming, chapters 7-8. 
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guides, standardised records, account books, court reports, all of these very boring and 
functional texts which historians have not paid much attention to. Yet rather than 
studying this vital quotidian literature of the Raj, scholars have focused has on works 
produced by people like them, by scholars and intellectually-minded bureaucrats who 
wrote histories of Indian regions, disquisitions on Indian law or religion, surveys of 
castes or tribes, or maps concerned with the detail of the landscape not land rights. As 
interesting as they may be, they texts were produced by figures who were often marginal 
to the process of government, in institutions distant from the point at which British power 
governed its ordinary subjects. Even where their authors did matter, there is little 
evidence their intellectual pursuits affected their governmental actions. Herbert Risley 
was both the author of the great classificatory digest of the Indian population, the Peoples 
of India, and a senior bureaucratic who wrote proposal for Lord Curzon to partition the 
province of Bengal. Yet, as Chris Fuller argues, there is no evidence one influenced the 
other. The partition of Bengal was a tactical move designed to preserve British power by 
dividing two communities – Muslim and Hindu Bengalis – who according to The Peoples 
of India had separate ethnographic reality. The point is that a different logic governed 
administrative decision-making compared to writing more ‘scholarly’ forms of analysis.7 
 
The argument here is that the process by which imperial institutions, particularly the legal 
system, made people into subjects was not primarily concerned about classification. The 
priority was the visible exercise of power, the smooth functioning of a system of rule 
viewed normatively as a ‘machine’ which tried to minimise points of contestable contact 
with the population it ostensibly ruled. Knowledge was not itself an instrument of power. 
Knowledge about the subjects of the imperial regime was collected and constructed by 
government institutions in various forms, of course, in revenue surveys, in censuses, in 
reports about local custom, in the inquiries made by courts into the circumstances of a 
particular case. Sometimes knowledge was created at some distance from sites of direct 
political authority, by individuals ruled by purposes which were detached from the 
operation of governmental power. Mapping projects, censuses, collections of botanical 
                                                        
7 Chris Fuller, ‘Anthropology and Government in British India, 1881-1911: Ibbetson and Risley 
Reconsidered’, talk at Religious Diversity Colloquium, Max Planck Institut, Göttingen, May 6, 2014. 
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specimens, translations of Indian texts, all developed their own institutional momentum 
which was only indirectly connected to imperial rule. Where knowledge was directly 
produced in the practice of government knowledge it was thin and perfunctory, often 
deliberately so. In institutions such as courts and revenue offices, the discursive 
constitution of South Asian subjectivity was always subordinate to an essentially self-
referential system of power. To make the point another way: India’s British 
administrators were only interested in their Indian subjects when a particular problem or 
crisis forced them to take notice. The most detailed engagement with the social practices 
of their subjects occurred with those seen as the greatest danger to British power. For 
example, late nineteenth century inquiries about local custom were most frequently made 
into areas seen as most likely to resist: in border areas, or in ‘tribal’ regions. Where they 
could, the British tried to get away without ‘knowing the country’ at all. 
 
If colonial knowledge cannot tell us everything we need to know about the way imperial 
power worked, we need to look elsewhere. This paper suggests that historians should 
move beyond language, to look to the practical, unspoken features of action in different 
contexts to explain the character of imperial domination. Here, the concepts of mood and 
temperament are useful. ‘Temperament’ or ‘temper’ were once important concepts within 
political sociology, denoting the style with which individuals go about their lives, how 
they practically respond to events and act upon the world. In ancient Greek and early 
Islamic medicine, thinkers connected temperament to different forms of bodily fluid, and 
spoke about four moods: sanguine, choleric, melancholic and phlegmatic. Temperament 
was variously attributed to body type, race and climate. It remains an important part of 
everyday speech: we speak of people as rash, impatient, decisive, languid. Yet, the 
rejection of physical determinism led modern social scientists to abandon temperament as 
an explanatory category in the nineteenth century, much to the detriment of scholarly 
analysis. Now, our language of historical explanation tries to explain events only with 
reference to explicitly held beliefs and intellectual categories. We know from our own 
experience that there is so much more to human action.
8
 
                                                        
8 For a political theorist’s use of the concept of temperament, see Joshua I. Miller, Democratic 
Temperament: The Legacy of William James, Kansas, KN: University Press of Kansas, 1997; For a 
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The quality British officers in nineteenth century India valued most highly in themselves 
was efficiency. Being efficient meant acting in a quick and authoritative way, making 
decisions with as little information as necessary, recognising that British rule would cease 
if it became too heavily immersed in Indian contexts or detail. ‘An efficient district 
officer’, John Strachey said, ‘watches every department of the administration; he is 
always ready to intervene, but he does not occupy himself with the details of business’. 
The imperial temperament encouraged fast action in defence of imperial prestige. It 
valued impartiality, aloofness, detachment. It also created a prickly disposition and a 
tendency towards paranoia. This was a temperament which made the quick resort to 
violence when trouble occurred always a possibility. 
 
Efficiency relied on being disconnected from interests, commitments and forms of 
knowledge particular to local society, and which slowed the governing process down. 
Indian officers working for the colonial regime were seen as ‘inefficient’ when their 
minds were being distracted by local concerns. They could only become efficient agents 
of the colonial governance if they adopted a temper and set of techniques that detached 
them from the Indian worlds they grew up in.
 
 Aparajith Ramnath’s recent study of 
colonial engineering shows how British administrators and politicians believed that 
Indian irrigation officers were technically competent, but ‘were subject to outside 
influences’, as one British chief officer put it, which reduced their efficiency. Writing in 
1882, the senior officer John Strachey thought the calibre of Indian officers in the 1850s 
had been very poor, but the ‘honest and efficiency’ of Indian judges had improved for 
two reasons. Their pay had increased, so they didn’t need to take money from local allies 
in return for partial decisions. And their practice was now determined more intensively 
by codes of law, by abstract systems that brought them into the fold of the imperial 
regime’s self-referential system of power. Strachey was an enthusiastic advocate of the 
Code of Criminal Law, a text drafted entirely from abstract principles. ‘The system it lays 
down is complete, efficient and successful’, entirely avoiding the need for European or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
discussion of late enlightenment uses of the concept, see Ludmilla Jordanova, ‘Sex and Gender’, in 
Christopher Fox and Roy Porter, Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains, eds., 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995. 
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Indian judges to engage with sources outside the court on the nature of law. The code 
represented a hermetically sealed system of power.
9
 
 
Because it didn’t rely on an explicit set of beliefs or arguments, because it existed in 
practice not ideas, in a mood or attitude rather than an ideology, the temperament of late 
nineteenth-century imperial rule offered significant space for challenge. The non-
discursive character of British domination created room for alternative stories of what it 
meant to be subjects (in both senses of that word) in India. The courts, in particular, 
provided an arena for Indian interlocutors of British authority to fundamentally contest 
the practices of imperial power. For Syed Mahmud and others, that challenge seemed to 
offer the possibility of a very different, non-imperial form of Indian legal subjectivity. As 
we’ll see, Mahmud fundamentally contested the tacit assumptions British imperialists 
made about the basis of their authority. That challenge then led to a negative critique of 
the style with which the British exercised power, and a positive effort to create an 
alternative form of jurisprudence based on a different kind of practice. Where Sir John 
Edge and most of this European colleagues issued terse statements that referred solely to 
texts produced by other British officers in order to produce quick and certain rules of 
decision, Mahmud’s judicial practice was an attempt to root legal decisions in what he 
saw as the historical practices of Indian social life. Rather than reflecting the anxious 
desire to make quick decisions in a hostile environment (as it seemed to British judges) 
Mahmud believed the task of the judge was to take part in a conversation about law in 
India that he believed was centuries old and long preceded British rule. That approach 
needed patient sensitivity to the languages and idioms of Indian life, which the brusque, 
impatient and self-obsessed style of colonial justice denied. For Mahmud, this practice 
was nothing less than the undoing of a regime based on imperial conquest, creating a 
political order instead founded on consent not violence. 
 
The challenge which Mahmud and others offered to British power agreed with the 
abstract statements which British imperial officers made about the benevolent 
                                                        
9 Aparajith Ramnath, ‘Engineers in India. Industrialisation, Indianisation and the State, 1900-47’, 
Unpubllished PhD Dissertation, Imperial College, 2012, p.123; John Strachey, India, London: Kegan, 
Paul & Trench, 1888, p. 148. 
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possibilities of British rule. But, in the process, they dramatically challenged the structure 
of British argument, reframing the practical, institutional and affective history of 
imperialism in ways that made partial agreements with the claims of empire beside the 
point. To understand how Indians were made into subjects, we need to recognise both the 
character of British rule and the complexity and subtlety of late nineteenth century 
Indians’ critical engagement with empire. On the one hand, historians need to see 
imperial power is a process that cannot be comprehended by colonial discourse. At the 
same time, they also need to recognise that elite Indian relations with empire cannot be 
reduced to belief or otherwise in the potential virtues of British power.  
 
By examining the encounter between Mahmud and the British judges in the Allahabad 
court, this chapter engages with two concerns central to this volume. First, what does it 
mean to see subjecthood as an act, as Gunnel Cederlof suggests in the introduction to this 
volume? The following pages suggest that it’s non-discursive, often physical character 
made the relationship between subject and state open to radically different interpretations, 
even within the same institution. Secondly, how do governmental institutions enforce 
limits to the plural meanings which subjecthood might have? In nineteenth-century north 
India, the British regime was comfortable when Indians like Syed Mahmud articulated 
rival stories about subjecthood and imperial citizenship. But conflict occurred, and 
authority was (temporarily) re-imposed when those stories involved radically different 
forms of judicial practice which were rooted in a temperament that challenged the mood 
of imperial power. 
 
Memories of Conquest 
For both Syed Mahmud and his European interlocutors, arguments about law and subject-
hood were cut through with memories and perceptions of conquest. The war of re-
conquest which followed the Indian insurgency of 1857, an event still in the memory 
both of middle-aged Indians and senior British officers in the 1880s, was crucial. For 
many officers within the newly proclaimed British empire of India, the act of re-conquest 
needed to be followed by the emphatic and visible assertion of Britain’s sovereignty. 
1857 gave the British an edgy kind of confidence. The rebellion proved the seemingly 
10  
dangerous predicament of British power in India, indicating the scale of opposition. But it 
also appeared to the imperial regime was safe if it was capable of countering opposition 
with sufficient violence. 
 
1857-8 had a large impact on law in India. North India’s military re-conquest was 
followed by the legislative subjugation of the subcontinent, as the new Crown regime 
issued a rapid succession of statutes which attempted to impose a rational and systematic 
legal order on India. ‘The effect of the Mutiny on the Statute-book was unmistakable’, 
Stephen went on to argue in his History of the English Criminal Law. It was ‘practically a 
principle of British government … that serious disaster in any department of public 
affairs should be followed by large legislative or administrative reconstruction’, his friend 
Sir Henry Sumner Maine wrote. Britain’s catastrophic defeat and then decisive victory 
against the Mughal rebels gave British officers a new commitment to the permanency of 
their regime, creating a new effort to convert their military domination into a systematic 
regime through legal reform. The long-stalled project of enact codes of law to 
systematize the chaotic judicial institutions in Company India was given new energy. A 
revised version of Thomas Macaulay’s 1838 Code of Criminal Law was enacted in 1860, 
and the final document was concerned more than anything else to punish acts which 
threatened the security of the British regime, with ten sections on ‘offences against the 
state’ and only three on murder. The year before, the first consistent set of rules for civil 
courts were enacted. The 1859 Code of Civil Procedure more emphatically imposed the 
authority of British judges on trial proceedings. It removed the Indian legal advisors, the 
pandits and qazis who had previously offered British judges guidance on Hindu and 
Muslim traditions of jurisprudence. The code also made the court’s proceedings more 
‘simple and expeditious’, by removing written pleadings and judgements, and limiting 
the litigant’s appearance in court to a short interrogation on the ‘particulars of the case’. 
These were procedures designed to assert the power of British officials over a newly re-
11  
conquered country, to minimise the scope for serious dialogue at the point at which 
authority was asserted over India society.
10
 
 
But for Syed Mahmud’s father, it was North India’s conquest by the British in 1857-8 
which forced the ruling elite he belonged to reach an accommodation with British rule. 
Syed Ahmed Khan was born into a family of minor Mughal service gentry, and worked 
within the subordinate, Indian-run courts of the British regime in the region around Delhi 
since 1838. Initially his contact with Europeans were limited. Syed Ahmed Khan’s career 
was assisted by connections to a European officer, John Strachey. But as David Lelyveld 
notes, Syed Ahmed barely noticed the British in the books he wrote on the history of the 
region. The Delhi poet Mirza Ghalib criticised him for uselessly celebrating the dead 
past, when the prospect of British India was potentially glorious.
11
 
 
The defeat of the rebels and their Mughal sovereign in the great insurrection of 1857-8 
led Syed Ahmed Khan to see the British as a source of order and stability, the only 
possible supporter of North India’s Muslim elite and, most importantly rulers to whom 
submission was necessary by the brute fact of violence. Even then, Sir Syed (knighted in 
1888) saw friendship with the British as necessary but defensive and limited. As Faisal 
Devji notes, when Sir Syed suggested that ‘we can befriend the English socially’, it was 
only because he imagined that British goodwill would protect North Indian Muslims from 
dominance by numerically predominant Bengali Hindus. As Devji argues, Sir Syed was 
not interested in sharing political power with the British. Instead, his efforts focused on 
building educational institutions that would allow a defeated people to create a sphere of 
autonomous intellectual life in ‘a world over which they exercised no political control’ 12. 
 
Born seven years before the rebellion of 1857, Mahmud was educated at English-
language Benares College and then Calcutta University before travelling with his father 
                                                        
10 Sir James FitzJames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, London: Macmillan, 1883, 
III, 299; Sir Charles Wood Wood, ‘Despatch Relating to Judicial Procedure’, Parliamentary Papers 
1859 Session 2 (49). 
11 David Lelyveld, Aligarh’s First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1978, p.88. 
12 Faisal Devji, ‘Apologetic Modernity’, Modern Intellectual History 2007, 4 (8): 64. 
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to England in 1869. There, he studied law at Lincoln’s Inn, and was called to the bar in 
1872. Whilst in English he spent two years as student at Christ’s College Cambridge, 
coming second in an English language prize. Syed Ahmed later argued that his purpose in 
sending his child to England was defensive and (to use Devji’s phrase) apologetic. 
Instead of pushing him to join the class of men who wielded practical power in India, the 
father’s aim was to make his boy a weapon to attack British misrepresentations of Islam 
in the world of ideas. Mahmud would learn English and ‘acquire such a mastery in it that 
when he left the University he should be able to expose the blunders and errors which the 
English writers in Islam, the Founder of Islam, the Muhammadan Society and 
Government have, whether intentionally or not, committed’. The law was an irrelevant 
remunerative side-line, to be tolerated as it didn’t interfere with his ‘national work’.13 
 
Yet, somewhere between Britain and India, Mahmud formed the idea of an Anglo-Indian 
political order which exceeded the limited bounds for collaboration set by his father. At a 
dinner for British officers hosted in Allahabad to celebrate his return in 1872, Syed 
Mahmud spoke of the possibility of a greater degree of cooperation between the British 
and Indians than his father imagined. The 22 year-old Mahmud made the case for a 
liberal imperialism based not merely on liberal values but a common form of 
conviviality. His aim, like his father, was ‘to unite England and India socially even more 
than politically’. But unlike Syed Ahmed, Mahmud argued that Anglo-Indian sociability 
could create the foundation for a virtuous form of political power. ‘English rule in India’ 
could create an ethical state. But this state, he said, ‘in order to be good, must promise to 
be eternal’. That was impossible ‘until the English people are known to us more as 
friends and fellow subjects, than as rulers and foreign conquerors’. 
 
Mahmud expanded this argument in an essay he wrote for the Calcutta Review in 1879. 
Like his speech at Allahabad, the article had an educative aim, directed at an audience of 
British officials. In the piece, Mahmud began by noting the tense state of relations 
between the ‘English’ and Indians. ‘Under the influence of supposed grievances on the 
one hand, and the effects of injured pride on the other’, he said, ‘the political and social 
                                                        
13 Selections from Vernacular Newspapers, 465 (6), 1893: IOR, L/R/570. 
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relation of the Englishman with the people of this country becomes a matter of national 
antagonism or of personal insult and provocation’. British rule had, Mahmud argued, 
‘brought order and good government, peace and civilization’. But it was undermined by 
the intemperate conduct of Europeans. The ‘present state of feeling’, he said, was 
conductive neither ‘to the welfare of British rule or to the prosperity of India’.14 
 
Mahmud presented his article as a cool, dispassionate analysis of the causes that created 
mutual hostility between the two ‘races’. Nowhere did he discuss negative British 
representations of Indians. Mahmud was aware but unconcerned about the 
condescending rhetoric which India’s British rulers used to talk about Indian society or 
character. Instead he attacked the psychic effects of the way in which the British 
(wrongly he thought) talked about the kind of power they possessed. Mahmud argued that 
Britons imagined their rule in India was founded on physical force. The only story the 
British told about themselves was the one narrated by Thomas Macaulay, about the 
successful subjugation of India by force of arms. The British in India took unwarranted 
pride in being members of a nation that had conquered India. As he suggested, many 
‘Englishmen in India’ during the 1870s ‘tread the land of our birth with much greater 
consciousness of ‘the glory and rights of conquest’ than we imagine ever filled the bosom 
of characterized the demeanour of the hero of Plassey’, Robert Clive. In fact, Mahmud 
argued, British rule in India was based on cooperation and consent. Britain’s dominions 
in India were ‘acquired by means far different from physical violence’, he argued. The 
East India Company had been transformed from a body of merchants into an Indian 
sovereign through a series of ‘transactions or compacts’ between the British and legally-
constituted Indian political entities. Throughout these events, he suggested, ‘native 
agency, native friendship, native counsels, native valour, played an important part’. From 
the late eighteenth century, Indians had both suffered for and benefited from ‘British rule 
in India’. Thousands of Indians, for example,  ‘fought and fell for the English standard’ in 
1857. ‘The British empire in the East has been built up by the combined efforts of the two 
nations; it is the product of the bravery and energy of both the races’.  The British, 
Mahmud argued, did not rule India because of their ‘superior valour’ or ‘mechanical and 
                                                        
14 Mahmud, ‘British Rule in India’, 5. 
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chemical inventions’ but purely because of a ‘curious coincidence’, which couldn’t last 
long, that Europeans were better trained in government at his own particular moment in 
time. 
 
Historians now treat the claim that Indians consented to their own domination as a crucial 
plank within the rhetoric which India’s imperial rulers used to justify their domination.15 
It was, after all, the central argument made in a work usually regarded as a classic piece 
of imperialist apologetics, John R. Seeley’s Expansion of England. ‘[T]he conquest of 
India is not in the ordinary sense a conquest at all’, Seeley claimed. Mahmud and the 
Cambridge Regius Professor of History shared elements of a common argument. Both 
men wanted to downplay the role of military violence in the making and sustaining of 
empires, Seeley suggesting that it was their ‘violent military character that has made most 
Empires short-lived and liable to decay’.  Both Mahmud and Seeley were critical of 
arguments focused on the importance of hierarchical power, military honour and a belief 
in England’s peculiar destiny which characterised the new Tory ideology of empire that 
Benjamin Disraeli had articulated since the early 1870s, and which shaped the Earl of 
Lytton’s period as Viceroy between 1876 and 1880. Instead, as Seeley put it, there was 
‘nothing wonderful’ about the way Britain acquired or maintained its rule in India.16 
 
It’s worth dwelling on these connections, because it is possible that Seeley was Syed 
Mahmud’s teacher, although it’s not certain which direction the influence flowed 
between the two men. Seeley and Mahmud were at the same college in Cambridge at the 
same time. Both men arrived at Christ’s College in the Autumn of 1869, Mahmud as a 
19-year old undergraduate, Seeley returning to Cambridge as Regius Professor at the age 
of 35 after a spell as Professor of Latin University College London. Seeley’s Expansion 
of England was based on lectures given two years after Mahmud’s widely-read Calcutta 
Review article was read. Mahmud might have picked up his critique of conquest from 
conversations with Seeley given by the professor before his empire lectures. But, 
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Seeley’s text might also have been a plagiarism of Mahmud’s essay, which had widely 
circulated in Britain by John Strachey, the British officer closest to both Sir Syed Ahmed 
and his son. 
 
Seeley’s purpose, though, was very different from that of his Indian student. As Duncan 
Bell suggests, Seeley’s point was to persuade his British compatriots to shift their 
attention from India to those parts of Britain’s empire populated by ‘the English nation’, 
the white settler colonies. Seeley had an idealist (in every sense of that word) vision of 
global British state, bound together through the emigration of people with a common 
ethnic, intellectual and, particularly, religious heritage. Because ‘the races of India are far 
removed from us in all physical, intellectual and moral conditions’, India could never be 
truly part of Britain’s empire. British rule in Asia was based on a weak and contingent 
series of transactions, not the kind of unitary ideal made possible by a shared racial 
heritage. All the British could do was to act as ‘teachers and civilisers’ for the short term 
until, eventually, they would be expelled by people who vastly outnumbered them. ‘The 
English nation’ was, after all, ‘but an imperceptible drop in the ocean of an Asiatic 
population’17. 
 
If Seeley did plagiarise Syed Mahmud’s critique of the idea that India had never been 
conquered, he was translating an argument originally intended as a dramatic challenge to 
the sentiments of India’s British rulers into the idealist idioms of Cambridge political 
thought. In contrast to Seeley, Syed Mahmud believed that the history of treaties and 
alliances by which Indians had consented to the growth of British power had created a 
strong and stable regime based on mutual consent and continual negotiation. There was, 
of course, ‘no allegiance of blood or nationality’, and no ‘sacred ties of religion’ to bind 
Mahmud and his countrymen to the British. But, Mahmud posed the possibility of inter-
cultural friendship against Seeley’s assumption that people belonging to different 
religions could not combine into a single state. Mahmud was ‘convinced, the ties of law 
and constitution are ties stronger, in the nineteenth century, than ties of either blood or 
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religion’. Mahmud believed the British empire in India was a constitutional regime based 
on the historic process by which different Indian groups submitted to the authority of the 
Company and the Crown in a sequence of political negotiations. Each moment in this 
story transformed but did not annihilate the rights and laws which different groups of 
Indians possessed beforehand. If ruled by people with a friendly disposition to one 
another, Britain’s imperial constitution could provide an arena for a stable polity to be 
forged from ethnic and religious difference. This was a conception of the empire as a 
constitutional polity which intersected with arguments made about other imperial 
locations 
18
. 
 
The problem, for Mahmud, was that there was no such disposition. The passionate, 
irrational commitment of British imperialists to ‘the fallacious idea of being ‘the 
conquerors of India’ undermined the basis of a liberal imperial regime. That commitment 
corroded the empire’s legal and affective foundations. First, the idea that the British state 
in India was founded on violence allowed jurists to imagine India was a legal tabula rasa. 
As a result, they falsely imagined existing traditions of law had been abrogated by 
English sovereign power. But, as importantly, the false idea the English had of 
themselves as a people responsible for subjugating India by force created a temperament 
ruled by ‘bigotry’ and ‘fanaticism’. That temperament in turn prevented the kind of 
conviviality needed to sustain a government whose only basis could be the consent of 
those who were ruled.  
 
Seeley had argued that the absence of racial unity prevented empire from being an 
enduring reality. Mahmud, by contrast, believed British sovereignty could be a permanent 
source of ‘peace, order and prosperity’ if only British administrators learnt ‘the lessons of 
history’ and cultivated friendship with their fellow Indian subjects of the Crown. In 1879, 
Mahmud imagined that it was possible to instruct his British colleagues the true character 
of British rule. Far from assuming that the British would be India’s ‘teachers and 
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civilisers’, Mahmud thought Indian officials like him could teach the British the 
disposition necessary to sustain their empire.  
 
Law in Context 
Returning to India from England, Syed Mahmud began to practice as a barrister before 
the Allahabad High Court. His judicial career was rapid. Mahmud was appointed a 
sessions judge in 1873. In 1879, the same year he published his critique of conquest in 
the Calcutta Review, Mahmud began to stand in for British judges on the Allahabad High 
Court when they went on leave, leading to his permanent appointment on the bench in 
1887. During these fourteen years, Mahmud wrote and delivered over three hundred 
judgements. These mostly concerned cases which dealt with civil law, particular the law 
governing the inheritance of property. 
 
Mahmud’s judgements were long, educative and sociological. Usually at least 1,000 
words long, sometimes ten times that length, Mahmud’s legal opinions were almost 
always the longest offered in any case. Throughout his legal work, Mahmud would 
politely push and challenge his colleagues on the bench, offering his own deliberate, 
compliex reasons for a decision. British judges, by contrast, tended to give a pithy verdict 
with few reasons. Often, Mahmud’s opinion differed from other jurists, sometimes in a 
minority of one against the rest of the bench. Even when he concurred with their view, 
Mahmud presented his own arguments, using a different logic from his colleagues. 
Rather than simply emanating from the texts created within the self-validating world of 
colonial British justice in India, Mahmud’s judgements argue that law emerged from 
particular historical practices which existed beyond the court. To discover them, the 
judge needed a temperament capable of inquiring into local circumstances. 
 
To give an early example from his career. In 1884, a dispute was heard about whether a 
single Muslim could sue a mosque in a small village on behalf of a larger group who 
were denied access to the place of worship. The case was heard by the full bench of five 
judges. The Chief Justice, Comer Petheram, gave a pithy, 274 word opinion based on a 
section of the India’s Code of Civil Procedure and a conception of ‘custom’ derived from 
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case law. Mahmud agreed with the verdict, but added a lengthy series of ‘observations 
regarding the Muhammadan Law’, four times as long as the Chief Justice’s opinion. The 
principle that a mosque was endowed for all Muslims was ‘too well known among 
Muhammadan lawyers’ for authorities to need to be cited, he said. Mahmud challenged 
an earlier judgement by British judges in Calcutta which offer a very narrow definition of 
who could assert an assert  ‘interest’ and therefore according to the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Mahmud suggested that worshippers ‘have the most direct interest in a 
mosque’. Mahmud’s opinion was concerned with more than simply ensuring the right 
judgement was made in one case. His opinion challenged previous British case had 
excluded a group of Muslims from being able to use a mosque, and lay down a legal 
principle based neither on text or statute but the court’s sensitivity to principles which 
had been continually consented to by a particular community 
19
. 
  
Mahmud’s imagined India’s polity as a collection of social and religious communities, 
held together by a common set of manners and legal institutions. Governed with the right 
techniques and temperament, Mahmud believed law was an institution capable of 
allowing the norms and practices of different Indian communities to speak, and 
sustaining social cohesion by negotiating their difference. Particularly important for 
Mahmud were the spheres of Indian, Muslim and Hindu, ‘religious’ law that a succession 
of legislative authorities in Britain India insisted should govern ‘succession, inheritance, 
marriage, or caste, or any religious usage or institution’. This provision, which Mahmud 
suggested ‘first found legislative enactment in the year 1780’ but was confirmed by 
section 24 of the 1871 Bengal Civil Courts Act was ‘one of the most important 
guarantees given to the people if India by the British rule’. For Mahmud, religious law 
wasn’t merely a shrunken domain of ‘personal law’ that governed a limited range of 
transactions with static, textually transcribed rules. It was the sphere within which the 
political constitution of India’s pre-colonial past survived into the colonial present. 
 
In contrast to British judges who frequently complained about the incoherence of Hindu 
and Muslim juridical traditions, Mahmud argued that each offered a complex but certain 
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set of procedures for resolving disputes, even in areas which the British since introduced 
statutes or codes of law to regulate. In an 1884 case about what to do with land belonging 
to a Muslim man who had vanished without trace, Mahmud spilt pages of ink explaining 
the different reasons Muslim jurists had given for establishing when a missing person 
could be considered dead, showing how these arguments relied on ‘logical methods’ from 
Arabia and ancient Greece which could flexibly accommodate themselves to different 
social conditions. There was both an apologetic, nostalgic quality to the discussion, as 
Mahmud’s point was that deciding whether a missing person was dead wasn’t a 
‘religious’ question – so the British-authored code of Civil Procedure applied instead. 
Petheram, the Chief Justice, drew the same conclusion from different premises. Muslim 
law had, he argued, been superceded by a law better attuned to modern conditions. ‘It 
was’, he said, ‘to benefit the people of this country by enabling proof to be given of facts 
which should be known’ that the vagaries of Muslim law had been replaced by a certain, 
British legal code 
20
. 
 
The 1884 case illustrates well the contrast between the juridical temperament of Mahmud 
and his British brother judges. Comer Petheram sought legal certainty in a British statute 
in what was otherwise, for him, an uncertain legal environment. Petheram certainly found 
no pleasure in delving into the rules of Indian law and social practice. Where a rule had 
been enacted by the British state in India, the Chief Justice quickly summarized it and left 
his opinion as that. Mahmud, by contrast, clearly enjoyed his scholarly investigation into 
the arguments of early Muslim jurists about missing persons. Rather than desperately 
clinging to sharp, abstract and absolute black-letter rules, here as in other cases he told a 
nuanced and complex story about the relationship between the rules of law, the principles 
of logic and changing social practice. 
 
Perhaps this opposition was most sharply drawn in one of Mahmud’s most famous cases, 
Govind Dayal versus Inayatullah, a judgment about whether a neighbor had preference 
over a Hindu stranger when a Muslim sold land. The case, that came before the 
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Allahabad Court in 1883, was heard by the full bench of five judges. It was an issue that 
had bedeviled British judges in India for a long time. Since the earliest British attempts to 
administer justice in India, British officials had recognized the Muslim juridical principle 
of haq-shafi, that anyone harmed by the sale of property had a right to object and put a 
stop to the transaction. But did Muslim law apply when all the parties weren’t Muslims? 
There was, the British thought, no similar principle in any Hindu juridical school. It was a 
tricky question. 
 
For almost a century, British judicial officials tried to determine this kind question as 
‘efficiently’ as possible, trying to make a decision without getting immersed in the 
details. The judge in a case in Dhaka in Bengal during the 1790s simply outsourced the 
decision to his Indian legal officers. Framing the problem in abstract terms, William 
Douglas asked the court’s qanungu (record-keeper), kazi (Muslim law expert) and pandit 
(Hindu law expert) to declare ‘the Custom of the Country when the land of a Talookdar 
[landholder] is entermised with that of another’. Could ‘a Person residing in a different 
part of the Country’ purchase against the wishes of other local proprietors’? Without 
explaining why, all three said no, so Douglas issued a decree accordingly. What’s striking 
about this early judgement is that the British court didn’t pose the issue as a question in 
specifically Muslim law, and didn’t attempt to discover or impose external rules upon the 
case.
21
 
 
At work in 1793 was an early colonial way of thinking about justice that privileged the 
concept of custom, and thus which didn’t have any problem with a case involved people 
from different religious communities. But, as I’ve argued previously, British anxiety 
about using Indian sources of authority caused them to transcribe Indian juridical 
traditions into a series of pithy rules, and in the process to disembed the law from the 
local contexts which once gave it meaning. Rather than being a custom pertaining to a 
particular place, and thus variable and seemingly indefinite across space and time, the 
law of pre-emption was deemed to belong to a fixed set of rules that could be printed and 
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disseminated across space, and which thus belonged to a particular trans-local 
community. This law was summarised (one might say created) for judges with little 
knowledge of India’s jurisprudential traditions by handy texts such as William H. 
MacNaghten’s 1825 guide, Principles and Precedents of Moohummudan Law, which 
defined pre-emption as 'a power of possessing property which has been sold, by paying a 
sum equal to that paid by the purchaser', which could be claimed by a property's partner, 
a ‘participator in its appendages’ or a neighbour. These texts, together with case-law, 
constituted a coherent because self-referential system of meaning which treated legal 
subjects as individuals entirely divorced from their particular social situation, and instead 
the bearer of a particular abstract, Hindu or Muslim, legal identity. The trouble, of course, 
was that it began to raise the question of which law should apply in cross-community 
cases 
22
. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the British judges in the Allahabad court tried to resolve the issue by 
relying on as little Indian law or knowledge as possible. They took refuge in a 
combination of British-enacted statute law and their own sense of fair play. Because it 
involved litigants from two different religions, the court ‘was not bound to administer 
Muhammadan law’, Justice Oldfield argued in an opinion which was no longer than three 
sentences. But, he noted that the Bengal Civil Courts Act had, like its predecessors, 
insisted that when laws were unclear disputes should be resolved with ‘justice, equity and 
good conscience’. It would, the British judges believed, be unjust for ‘persons who were 
not Muhammadans, but who had dealt with Muhammadans in respect of property’ to be 
governed by different laws, so Muslim law applied.  The Chief Justice, Comer Petheram, 
concurred in another three-sentence long opinion. Relying on ‘the text-books of 
Muhammadan law’, he said there was ‘no doubt what the Muhammadan law was’ and 
insisted it was equitable neighbouring Hindus were subject to the same law. 
 
Syed Mahmud’s opinion was a long essay of more than 15,000 words, which considered 
a combination of history, Muslim legal tradition and case-law. Mahmud’s over-riding 
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concern was that equity not be used as a mechanism to introduce foreign law to India. 
Against his ‘brother judges’ use of ‘justice, equity and good conscience’ to apply Muslim 
law in a discretionary way, Mahmud argued that the Muslim law of pre-emption should 
apply on its own terms. A neighbour’s right to buy land which otherwise would have 
been sold to a stranger was, he argued, ‘a religious usage or institution’, even where the 
original purchaser was not a Muslim. Mahmud’s argument was, again, reliant on 
historical social practice. ‘[F]ounded by the Prophet upon Republican principles’, the 
Muslim law of inheritance divided property into numerous fractions between its owners’ 
relatives on his or her death. Unless strangers were excluded from being able to buy land, 
the dispersal of property would dissolve the relationship between family members and 
lead to anarchy. Originally established by Muslim jurists, Mahmud nonetheless argued 
that pre-emption had become accepted social practice amongst Hindus in India too. ‘The 
administration of law by Kazis’ under the Mughals had given ‘wide currency to haq-i-
shufa’, so it became ‘the common law of the country’. British case-law on the subject 
offered a mix of contradictory opinions. But Mahmud argued that the logic both of the 
original Muslim law and its continuance through the history of pre-colonial and British 
times pointed to the legal validity of the rule. Historical practice and political necessity 
fused in his argument. There was, Mahmud suggested, a compelling political logic to the 
need to exclude strangers from buying land, recognised by the adoption of similar 
customs ‘even in some of the most civilized parts of Germany’. The law was a response 
to social necessity. In a society like India with such varied ‘distinctions of race, caste or 
creed’, ‘the intrusion of a stranger as a co-sharer must not only give rise to 
inconvenience, but disturb domestic comfort, if not, as in some cases, lead to breach of 
the public peace'
23
. 
 
To give a final example: in 1892, Mahmud sat on the bench with the new Chief Justice, 
Sir John Edge as well as Justice Straight, to hear a case concerning another issue which 
had long vexed judges in British India, whether a Hindu couple could give an only child 
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away for adoption. Both the British judges gave short, pithy verdicts, which relied 
entirely on previous case-law which itself depended on mid nineteenth century British 
digests of Hindu law, texts by H.T. Colebrooke and J.C. Sutherland as well as W.H. 
MacNaghten. These opinions were, in other words, locked within the self-affirming web 
of texts that allowed British jurists to imagine the law they administered was secure. 
There was no discussion of the reason for the law or it’s social context, simply the search 
for a certain rule of decision.  Mahmud’s opinion was 14,000 words long, and began by 
suggesting Edge and Straight’s readings was out of date. The scholars of Hindu law who 
gave the Tagore Law Lectures at Calcutta University in 1883 and 1888, had gone back to 
the original Sankrit sources of the law. Drawing on their historicist inquiries, Mahmud 
offered a complex story of the relative place of different authorities in the evolution of 
Hindu law. Ultimately, Mahmud agreed with Sir John Edge, suggesting that it was not 
illegal for an adopted only child to inherit their adopted child’s estate. But in the process 
of making that case, Mahmud made an important argument about both the importance of 
social practice, and the endurance of Hindu rules of interpretation through time. Mahmud 
quoted Manu, the first great dharmasastric text saying that it was the sacred duty of the 
king to ‘enquire into the laws of castes, of districts, of guilds, and of families, and settle 
(or protect) the peculiar law of each’. Later, he quoted Vasista. ‘To import foreign ideas 
and bring them to bear upon interpreting Sanskrit texts when modes of interpretation 
sanctioned by Hindu logicians of the highest authority are forthcoming is an obvious 
error’24. 
 
 
By the late 1880s, the difference in temperament between Syed Mahmud and the 
‘foreign’ judges on the Allahabad bench, particularly Sir John Edge, had begun to 
seriously break down. The clash in the style with which the two men delivered their legal 
opinions had begun to corrode their personal relationship. Edge was frustrated with the 
length of time it took Mahmud to write and deliver each verdict. Mahmud became 
increasingly suspicious that the other judges were making decisions without him. 
Mahmud suggested that the ‘English business’, matters like filling in statistical data on 
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cases, answering the government’s requests for advice on legislation, and deciding who 
should judge adjudicate what cause, were conducted in secret meetings he had no access 
to. ‘The matter to which the correspondence related was not of any radical importance’, 
Mahmud noted whilst making one complaint. But it was an ‘important matter of 
principle’ that the court’s only Indian judge was equally involved in making all decisions. 
To make sure he wasn’t being excluded, Mahmud insisted on checking every letter 
written from the court as a whole. In a move ostensibly to satisfy but calculated to rile, 
the Chief Justice asked for all the administrative paperwork of the court, however minor, 
to pass Mahmud’s office for his ‘consideration’ before being signed off. ‘The result’, as 
Mahmud noted, ‘was that on rising from the bench at 4 o’clock in the afternoon I used to 
find official files about two feet high in a heap on my table, and sometimes so much that 
the front seat of my carriage could hardly hold them’. 
 
The judges’ response to the crisis tells us something important about the temperament 
which ruled the court. Instead of working to rebuild trust between the two sides, the 
British judges insisted on writing a ‘Code of Rules’ that would systematise the 
functioning of the court, creating formal equality between the different members of the 
court, making sure matters that had been dealt with informally before under the gaze of 
written thus supposedly accountable standards of abstract justice. The new rules created a 
mechanism for voting on contentious issues. Previously Mahmud thought he had been 
excluded through the subtle exercise of informal forms of power. But the code merely 
institutionalised his marginalisation, providing a formal mechanism for him to be 
outvoted by the other judges without, supposedly any hard feelings. As a way of 
resolving tension, the code fundamentally missed the point. It was their different attitudes 
towards the law, their different temperament rather than Mahmud’s exclusion from 
decision-making that had created conflict. Chief Justice Edge continued to argue that 
Mahmud was ‘obstructive and inclined to raise unnecessary obstacles to the discharge of 
business’. 
 
It was what Mahmud said about the law itself that finally ended his career. Mahmud’s 
long, technical opinions on Muslim law remain amongst the few nineteenth-century legal 
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judgements still quoted in Indian courts today, but they were a source of conflict during 
Mahmud’s High Court career. Mahmud’s British colleagues suggested that the length of 
time it took him to compile his judgements interrupted the rule of colonial law. Mahmud 
did not understood that the British regime depended on efficient, quick decision-making. 
The detail didn’t matter as long as a decision was definite. Edge accused Mahmud of 
being ‘dilatory and inattentive as a Judge, causing much delay in the decision of cases, 
and not doing his fair share of work’. He was accused of arriving drunk at work, and 
being plagued by ‘intemperate habits of mind’. In response, Mahmud claimed that delays 
occurred because ‘his judgements [we]re very much more careful and elaborate than 
those delivered by any of the other Judges in the Court’. There’s no doubt that they were 
longer, and that Mahmud worked hard. It wasn’t unusual for him to write 20,000 words 
of legal opinions a week. Mahmud argued that he was ridiculed by his fellow judges for 
the care and detail he took, and the broader range of sources his judgements relied on. 
When he quoted Bentham in a long opinion on the law of salvage, the Chief Justice 
remarked ‘You should in future be called Jeremy’.  As Mahmud suggested, ‘considering 
my relations with him at the time, this could neither be interpreted as a friendly joke or a 
compliment, and it was evidently intended as a sneer’. Whatever its cause, Edge argued 
that Mahmud’s tardy practice meant he was ‘indifferent to the necessity which existed for 
clearing off the arrears of business, and for giving prompt decisions As Lieutenant-
Governor Charles Crossthwaite noted in a letter recommending he eventually not be 
allowed to return to the court after taking a period of leave, if Mahmud was not removed 
there was no hope of clearing the Allahabad court’s growing arrears 25. 
 
Allahabad’s British judges insisted that the disagreement was purely ‘official’, and not 
based on personal animosity or any sense of racial difference. Edge argued Mahmud had 
been treated better because he was Indian; Mahmud wished that ‘he [had] only been 
treated as an ordinary English Puisne judge of the Court, without any halo of being 
patronized by Sir John on account of my nationality’. Anxieties on each side stemmed 
from the different arguments and temperament they brought to the practice of the law and 
these in turn no doubt stemmed from their relationship with different social worlds. As a 
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Muslim Indian judge in a British court, Mahmud straddled two intellectual environments. 
One, the bureaucratic world of the colonial court was ruled by the ‘expedient’ logic of 
rapid judicial decision-making. It nominally administered something called 
‘Mahommedan’ or ‘Hindu’ law, but privileged short, pithy rules, and did not need to 
defend the judgements it made before an informed Indian public. This world spilt out 
from Allahabad’s law court into the civil lines with its cantonment, club and masonic 
lodge, all concerned to defend British power come what may. For the British, Allahabad 
was the seat of a High Court and a military town, which did not stray past the railway line 
which divided the city between European and Indian zones. Syed Mahmud lived here, but 
he also inhabited another world, populated by the friends in Allahabad he sat talking and 
drinking with late into the night, but also extending outwards, amongst sections of the 
official Muslim elite in North India and princely states like Hyderabad. This was an 
Urdu, Persian and Arabic culture where, imaginably, the detailed arguments Mahmud 
made about law and it’s relationship with Indian history and society were argued and 
defended, and mattered in a very different way.  
 
My point is that empire was not only built on the explicit arguments made by its 
protagonists. It was sustained by tacit, unarticulated assumptions and idioms, sensibilities 
and temperaments, in the cases we’ve discussed in this paper about how disputes were to 
be decided, and how it was appropriate to act in court. The forgotten, unspoken nature of 
those assumptions and idioms made it possible for someone like Syed Mahmud, who 
wasn’t part of the same social world, to imagine they could take part in imperial justice 
on equal terms. It allowed, indeed, liberal imperialists – British and Indian - to frame a 
powerful critique of the exclusive character of imperial justice. But colonial law, like the 
rest of Britain’s imperial administration of India, was constituted by a gap between theory 
and practice. Mahmud’s career, and the life of the law in colonial India more generally 
were caught in the gap between liberal justice’s language of universalism and the 
visceral, emotional history of Europe’s practical effort to wield and protect its power in 
India. 
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For us, and perhaps for Syed Mahmud, the tension present in the Allahabad court was the 
consequence of a complicated set of contradictions contained within the practice of 
empire. Mahmud’s father, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, told a very different, and far simpler 
story. In a newspaper article written soon after his son resigned from the court noted that 
the British might ‘brag about their impartiality’ Sir Syed said. They certainly had done a 
lot of that in the correspondence that ended Syed Mahmud’s career. But it was impossible 
for ‘the conquerors of this country’ to sit ‘together on the same bench’ in ‘equal terms of 
respect of honour’ with members of a conquered nation. As Sir Syed argued, 
 
If an Indian in such a position tries to preserve his self-respect which is 
concomitant to nobility and uprightness, the relations between him and his 
European colleagues get embittered. On the other hand, if utterly regardless of 
self-respect he makes himself quite subservient to the wishes of his European 
colleague, who because he belongs to a conquering race, naturally believes in his 
superiority, he is able to pull on pretty well. But this can never be expected from a 
man who wishes to remain true to his conscience, and in whose veins runs the 
blood of his (noble) ancestors. It is no secret that there is as much difference 
between the Englishman’s treatment of his own countryman and that of others as 
there is between black and white. 
 
For Sir Syed, tension in the court was the unavoidable after-effect of the honorific 
violence that underpinned British sovereignty in India. Sir Syed had not wanted Mahmud 
to be a judge in the first place, or occupy any position involving proximity to Europeans. 
Mahmud was supposed to become friends with Europeans, but not seek to exercise 
governmental power jointly with them. Echoing a long-standing Indian critique of British 
bureaucracy, Sir Syed was glad that Mahmud had been liberated from the demeaning 
clock-watching of the court and was now ‘the master of his own time’26. 
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With its reference to concepts such as honour and conquest, the language of Sir Syed’s 
article belonged to a different world from the texts produced by the judges of the court 
themselves. But his comments open up a possible alternative history of the resentments 
and frustrations of Indian life under British rule. That history wouldn’t take colonial 
rhetoric for the sum total of colonial reality, and wouldn’t assume ‘difference’ only 
matters when it was asserted in coherently articulated categories. It wouldn’t fixate on the 
internal contradictions of colonial liberalism, but would instead traces the way Indians 
sometimes learnt to live with, otherwise challenged what many recognised as the fact of 
conquest. Told as part of the story of the violent and visceral process of British rule in 
India, moments that have long been forgotten might be seen in a new light. For example: 
if the public rhetoric of imperial liberalism is all there is to the history of British rule, the 
Indianisation of the law and civil service in the twentieth century is an unproblematic 
moment of transition. But if colonial law only made sense to its British practitioners if it 
part of a culture of European-only conviviality rooted in the fact of violent domination, 
Indianisation takes on a different completion. It would entail the creation of a different 
practical form of Indian subjecthood, which dramatically challenged the acts by which 
the British asserted their power. The rise in the number of Indians on the bench as 
lawyers in court, just like the increasing employment of Indians in senior government 
service, might be seen as a profound rupture, a moment that changed the practices as well 
as the personnel of British rule.  
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